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I. INTRODUCTION

Federal income tax laws under the Internal Revenue Code
(hereinafter the "Code" or the "I.R.C") are inherently complex and
strikingly ambiguous when applied to specific taxpayer situations.' Due
to the complexity and uncertainty of the law, taxpayers often seek out
expert opinions and advice from tax attorneys regarding potential tax

consequences.

Taxpayers seek professional advice for several reasons

and in a variety of contexts. One, taxpayers "wish to know what the law
* B.B.A., University of Wisconsin; J.D. University of Wisconsin; Professor, The John Marshall
Law School. The author thanks Benjamin Lavin, a student at The John Marshall Law School, for
his assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. "The income tax laws, as every citizen knows, are far from a model of clarity. Written to
accommodate a multitude of competing policies and differing situations, the Internal Revenue Code
is a sprawling tapestry of almost infinite complexity. Its details and intricate provisions have
fostered a wealth of interpretations. To thread one's way through this maze, the business or wealthy
taxpayer needs the mind of a Talmudist and the patience of Job." United States. v. El Paso Co., 682
F.2d 530, 534 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,466 U.S. 944 (1984).

AKRON TAX JOURNAL

[28:123

'2
is and whether they may take a particular position on a tax return.
Two, taxpayers "want to know how far they can go in aggressively
planning and minimizing their tax liabilities."3 Finally, taxpayers seek
advice from tax professionals in order to protect themselves from tax
penalties imposed by the Internal Revenue Service, should the IRS
challenge the taxpayer's position.4
Taxpayers often call upon tax professionals for advice prior to
taking a planned course of action. For example, a corporate taxpayer
planning to dispose of a subsidiary or other corporate assets will often
seek out the advice of a tax professional prior to consummating the
proposed transaction. First, the taxpayer will want to obtain an opinion
from its tax advisor as to the likely tax consequences of such a sale, for
example, how much taxable gain will be recognized on the sale. If the
tax consequences of the transaction are significant, the planned
disposition may be undesirable. Second, the taxpayer will want to know
what the tax law is, how the sale will be characterized, and when such
gain will be recognized for tax return purposes. Third, the taxpayer may
seek the tax attorney's advice and opinion as to how to structure the
transaction so as to avoid undesirable tax consequences. 5 Fourth, and
most importantly, the taxpayer will want to obtain a professional opinion
that it can rely upon as a defense to IRS penalties, should the IRS
disagree with the taxpayer's position.6
The IRS and the courts have taken the position that a taxpayer's
reliance on a tax professional's opinion is not always risk free. Such
Because the
position creates serious problems for taxpayers.
administration of the Federal income tax is based on a system of selfreporting, a taxpayer will usually seek professional tax advice and
opinions in order to accurately determine his tax liability, 7 especially

2. Scott A. Schumacher, Section 6694 PreparerPenalties and Tax Advice: The Latest on
the ConstantlyMoving Target, 23 No. 2 PRAC. TAX LAW 19, 19 (2009).
3. Id.
4. Id.; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4 (2013) (establishing that good faith and reasonable
reliance on professional advice may constitute a defense to the imposition of I.R.C § 6662 (2012)
penalties).
5. As Judge Learned Hand made clear: "a transaction, otherwise within an exception of the
tax law, does not lose its immunity, because it is actuated by a desire to avoid, or, if one choose, to
evade, taxation. Any one may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is
not bound to choose that pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty
to increase one's taxes." Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934), aff'd, 293 U.S. 465
(1935).
6. See generally United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241 (1985).
7. See generally David J.Moraine, Loyalty Divided: Duties to Clients and Duties to Othersthe Civil Liability of Tax Attorneys Made Possible by the Acceptance of A Duty to the System, 63
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involving complex transactions, i.e., a corporate restructuring.
Additionally, given the complexity of the tax law and the potential for
substantial penalties, if a taxpayer fails to file a return or fails to
accurately compute his tax liability, a tax advisor is usually the only
reliable source for information regarding whether filing a return is
necessary, what information must be disclosed, the manner in which
taxable gains or losses are characterized, and when such taxable gains or
losses are recognized. 8
The courts and the IRS have significantly reversed course regarding
a taxpayer's ability to rely on an advisor's tax opinion since U.S. v.
Boyle, 9 wherein the Supreme Court stated that "when an accountant or
attorney advises a taxpayer on a matter of tax law, such as whether ' a
liability exists, it is reasonable for the taxpayer to rely on that advice."'
The Court noted that because most taxpayers are unable to discern error
in the substantive advice from a tax professional, to "require [a] taxpayer
to challenge the attorney, to seek a 'second opinion,' or to try to monitor
counsel on the provisions of the Code himself would nullify the very
purpose of seeking the advice of a presumed expert in the first place.""
As the Court was undoubtedly aware, the Code is anything but simple to
understand and apply.
Tax Courts have consistently denied taxpayers, confronted with the
complexity of the Code, the right to reasonably rely on a tax2
professional's opinion regarding tax liability. Recently, the Canal1
court expressly denied the taxpayer's assertion that it could reasonably
rely on the tax opinion from its well-regarded, long-time return preparer
and auditor, PricewaterhouseCoopers (hereinafter, "PwC"), in
connection with the IRS' imposition of tax-related penalties.
Essentially, the court held that where a taxpayer consults his advisors
regarding the tax consequences of a proposed transaction, and such
advisor issues a favorable opinion regarding such tax consequences for
"a high price tag,"' 3 and where the advisor was actively involved in
planning and implementing the transaction, the taxpayer may not
reasonably rely on such favorable opinion." The Canal decision is
completely at odds with the Supreme Court's opinion that "ordinary
TAX LAW. 169, 170 (2009).
8. Id.
9. Boyle, 469 U.S. at 251.
10.
Id. (emphasis in original).
11.
Id.
12. Canal Corp. v. Comm'r, 135 T.C. 199 (2010).
13. Id. at220.
14. See generally id. at 218.
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business care and prudence" do not demand that a taxpayer challenge,
"second guess," or monitor tax counsel's substantive tax advice.' 5
Given the Canal court's rejection of the taxpayer's reliance on its
long-time attorney-accountant's substantive tax opinion regarding the
proposed transaction at issue, the question necessarily arises as to
whether and when a taxpayer may reasonably rely on his tax advisor's
advice and opinion in structuring and consummating a proposed
transaction. Additionally, given the Tax Court's stance on taxpayer
reliance on tax advisor opinions, what is required of a tax professional to
ethically and legally render a favorable opinion to a taxpayer on which it
may rely?
This Article considers the present law regarding the accuracy
related penalties pursuant to I.R.C § 6662 and the reasonable reliance
and good faith defense provided for in I.R.C § 6664 using Canal as a
prime example of how the courts have treated and penalized taxpayers
for relying on tax advisors in planning proposed transactions and in
taking positions on returns and proposes a new analysis of a taxpayer's
good faith and reasonable reliance. Section II of this Article discusses
the current state of the law regarding the Section 6662 penalties, the
function and regulations imposed on tax attorneys in advising taxpayerclients, the Section 6664 good faith and reasonable reliance defense, and
provides an overview of the facts and legal analysis underlying the Tax
Court's holding in Canal. Section III analyzes the current law and
presents a new analysis of a taxpayer's good faith and reasonable
reliance on his attorney's advice and opinions that should be
implemented by the IRS and the courts, which comports with all current
law, including the Circular 230 requirements imposed on tax
practitioners generally. Section IV will conclude this Article.
II. BACKGROUND

A.

Taxpayer Penalties

Taxpayers are subject to a number of penalties for the
understatement and underpayment of Federal income taxes.' 6 IRS
15. Boyle, 469 U.S. at 251. While the Court held that a taxpayer may reasonably rely on tax
counsel's professional opinion regarding substantive tax advice, a taxpayer may not rely on a tax
professional where compliance with an unambiguous statute can be accomplished by a lay person,
such as discerning when tax returns must be filed. Id. The Court stated: "one does not have to be a
tax expert to know that tax returns have fixed filing dates and that taxes must be paid when they are
due." Id.
16. I.R.C. § 6662(b)(1) (2013) ("negligence or disregard of rules or regulations"); §
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penalties exist and are imposed in order to encourage voluntary
compliance' 7 by supporting the standards of behavior expected by the
IRS. 8
"Penalties encourage voluntary compliance' 9 by: (1)
demonstrating the fairness of the tax system to compliant taxpayers; and

(2) increasing the cost of noncompliance.

2°

I.R.C § 6662 imposes an accuracy-related penalty for
underpayment of Federal income tax liability. 2' For the portion of
underpayment of tax required to be shown on a return, Section 6662
imposes an additional amount equal to twenty percent of the portion of
underpayment. 2 This penalty applies to the portion of underpayment
which is attributable to either: (1) negligence or disregard of rules or

regulations; or (2) any substantial understatement of income tax. 23
1. Negligence or Disregard of Rules of Regulations
The I.R.C defines the term "negligence" to include any failure to
make "a reasonable attempt to comply with the provisions of the tax
law, 24 exercise ordinary and reasonable care in tax return preparation, or
keep adequate books and records., 25 "Negligence is strongly suggested
if a taxpayer fails to make a reasonable attempt to ascertain the
correctness of a reported item 'which would seem to a reasonable and

6662(b)(2) ("substantial understatements of federal income tax"); § 6662(a) (understatements with
respect to reportable transactions); §6662(b)(6) (understatements with respect to "transactions
lacking economic substance or failing to meet the requirements of any similar rule of law").
17. "Taxpayers in the United States assess their tax liabilities against themselves and pay
them voluntarily." Byran E. Gates, Encouraging Voluntary Compliance, 5 I.R.M. ABR. & ANN. §
20.1.1.2.1 (Oct. 25, 2011). "This system of self-assessment and payment is based on the principle
of voluntary compliance. Voluntary compliance exists when taxpayers conform to the law without
compulsion or threat." Id.
18. Arthur H. Boelter, Tax Penaltiesand Interest, I TAX PEN. & INT. § 1:5 (2011). See also
I.R.S. Penalty Policy, I.R.M. 20.1.5.1,
5 (Jan.
24, 2012),
available at
http://www.irs.gov/irm/part20/irm_20-001-005.html#dOel 800 ("All penalties including the
accuracy-related penalties, the fraud penalty, and the erroneous claims for refund or credit penalty
are important deterrents to non-compliance.").
19. "Voluntary compliance is achieved when a taxpayer makes a good faith effort to meet the
tax obligations defined by the Internal Revenue Code." Gates, supra note 17, at § 20.1.1.2.1.
20. I.R.S. Penalty Statement 20-1 (Formerly P-1-18), I.R.M. 1.2.20.1.1, 3 (June 29, 2004),
available at http://www.irs.gov/irmi/part1/irm_01-002-020.html.
21. I.R.C. § 6662 (2013).
22. Id. at § 6662(a).
23. Id. at §§ 6662(b)(l)-(2). For purposes of this article, only § 6662(b)(1) (negligence or
disregard of rules or regulations) and § 6662(b)(2) (substantial understatement of income tax) are
relevant.
24. Id. at § 6662(c).
25. Gates, supra note 17, at §20.1.5.7. 1, .
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26
prudent person to be 'too good to be true' under the circumstances.'
For example, "[t]he accuracy-related penalty attributable to negligence
may be applicable if the taxpayer fails to make a reasonable attempt to
ascertain the correctness of claimed losses or deductions by thoroughly
investigating the bona fide economic or other relevant aspects of the
In determining whether the taxpayer made a "reasonable
transaction.
attempt," "[c]onsultation with a tax advisor ...is not, standing alone,
conclusive evidence of a thorough investigation by the taxpayer., 28 A
taxpayer's actions are reviewed under the totality of the circumstances
standard of review, which considers all relevant facts, "including the
nature of the tax investment, the independence of the tax advisor, the
competence of the tax advisor,
the quality of the opinion, and the
29
sophistication of the taxpayer.,
The I.R.C defines the term "disregard" to include any careless,
reckless, or intentional disregard of the Federal tax law. 30 "Disregard of
rules or regulations relates to the taxpayer's failure to follow the
appropriate law in completing the return, and reflects a disregard of the
IRC, temporary or final regulations, revenue rulings, or IRS notices."'"
Disregard of rules or regulations are:
* "Careless" if the taxpayer does not exercise reasonable care
to determine the correctness of a tax return;
" "Reckless" if the taxpayer makes little or no effort to
determine if a rule or regulation exists, under circumstances
demonstrating a substantial deviation from a reasonable
standard of conduct;
* "Intentional" if the taxpayer knows32of a rule or regulation
and ignores such rule or regulation.

2. Substantial Understatement of Income Tax
"For purposes of [§ 6662], there is a substantial understatement 33 of
income tax for any taxable year if the amount of the understatement for
26.

Id.

27.
28.
29.

Gates, supra note 17, at 2 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.

2; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(1)(ii) (2013).

30. I.R.C. § 6662(c) (2013).
31.
Disregardof Rules or Regulations, I.R.M. 20.1.5.7.2,
http://www.irs.gov/irm/part20/irm_20-001-005.html#dOe 1800.

1 (Jan. 24, 2012), available at

32. Id.at 3.
33. "[T]he term 'understatement' means the excess of(l) the amount of the tax required tobe
shown on the return forthe taxable year, over (2)the amount of the tax imposed which is shown on
the return."
I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(A).
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the taxable year exceeds the greater of-(1) 10% of the tax required to
be shown on the return for the taxable year, or (2) $5,000.,, 3 4 For
corporations, "there is a substantial understatement of income tax for
any taxable year if the amount of the understatement for the taxable year
exceeds the lesser of (1) 10 percent of the tax required to be shown on
the return for the taxable year (or, if greater, $10,000), or (2)
$10,000,000." 5 For example, a corporate taxpayer is required to show
$5,000,000 on its tax return for the year. It only shows $4,000,000. Ten
percent of $5,000,000, which is the tax required to be shown, is
$500,000, which is the amount of the understatement. However,
because $500,000 is greater than $10,000, there is only a substantial
understatement if the understatement exceeds $10,000,000.
Section 6662(d)(2)(B) provides, however, that the amount of the
understatement shall be reduced by that portion of the understatement
attributable to: (1) the tax treatment of any item by the taxpayer if there
is or was substantial authority for such treatment; or (2) any item if (a)
the relevant facts affecting the item's tax treatment are adequately
disclosed in the return or in a statement attached to the return, and (b)
there is a37reasonable basis3 6 for the tax treatment of such item by the
taxpayer.
B.

Tax Advisors
1. Function of Professional Advice

Due to uncertainties that may arise in specific situations, taxpayers
often, and indeed should, seek out tax planning 38 advice from
professional advisors in the form of a tax opinion regarding the potential
tax consequences of proposed transactions. 39 "Tax opinions describe the
34. Id. at § 6662(d)(l)(A).
35. Id. at § 6662(d)(1)(B). In other words, there is a substantial understatement if the
understatement exceeds the lesser of either ten percent of the tax required to be shown on the return,
or if ten percent of the tax required to be shown is greater than $10,000, there is a substantial
understatement of income tax for a corporation if the understatement exceeds $10,000,000.
36. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(3) (2013).
37. I.R.C. § 6662(d)(1)(B). "However, for purposes of subsection (b), above, in no event
shall a corporation be treated as having a reasonable basis for its tax treatment of an item
attributable to a multiple-party financing transaction if such treatment does not clearly reflect the
income of the corporation." Id.
38. "Tax planning includes, both with respect to prospective and completed transactions,
recommending or expressing an opinion on (a) a tax return position, or (b) a specific tax plan
developed by a professional, a taxpayer, or a third party." See INTERPRETATION NO. 1-2, "TAX
PLANNING," STATEMENT ON STANDARDS FOR TAX SERV. No. I: TAX RETURN POSITIONS 6 (2003).
39. Obtaining tax advice is especially important because of the IRS treatment-one might
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application of the tax laws to an actual or proposed situation faced by the
taxpayer., 40 Three types of opinions are of particular importance: (1)

planning opinions, (2) penalty protection opinions, and (3) tax shelter
marketing opinions.4 1 Planning opinions are rendered by an advisor to a
taxpayer for purposes of planning a proposed transaction and give the
advisor's opinion regarding the tax consequences of such transaction;
such opinions are rendered prior to commencing a proposed
transaction. 42 A taxpayer may obtain a penalty protection opinion 43 to
be used to defend against the assertion of tax penalties were the IRS to
44
successfully challenge the positions taken by a taxpayer on the return.
To be distinguished from planning opinions and penalty protection
opinions, which are sought by and rendered to a taxpayer-client, a tax
shelter marketing opinion is rendered by an advisor for the purpose of

marketing a tax shelter transaction to a non-client, such as a prospective
investor, or to be used by a tax shelter promoter in marketing a tax
shelter.45
In general, a tax opinion's function is to give a party to a proposed
transaction comfort 46 that the tax consequences that were assumed when
structuring the transaction will in fact be realized, to a varying degree of
certainty. 47 For example, a party selling an asset may accept a lower
call it a "crackdown"--of tax shelters. Id. at 5. There is a crucial (crucial to the taxpayer)
distinction between tax shelters and abusive transactions, which are illegal, and aggressive
transactions, which are legitimate. Id. The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
("AICPA") notes: "it must be recognized that taxpayers have a legitimate interest in arranging their
affairs so as to pay no more taxes than they owe.
It must be recognized that tax
professionals ... have a role to play in advancing these efforts." Id.
40.

M. JOHN STERBA, JR. & DAVID T. MOLDENHAUER, LEGAL OPINION LETrERS § 7.1

(2011).
41. See id. (noting five types of tax opinions: (1) taxpayer planning opinions, (2) tax return
position opinions, (3) penalty protection opinions, (4) financial audit opinions, and (5) tax shelter
marketing opinions).
42. id.
43. See generally id. (noting that penalty protection opinions are a subset of tax return
position opinions). Tax return position opinions are rendered by "a practitioner to his or her client
for purposes of assessing the positions that the client may take on a tax return." Id. Such opinions
are normally rendered after a taxpayer has commenced a transaction.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. A taxpayer cannot always rest assured that the IRS will agree with the tax opinion:
Legal opinions classically predict judicial outcomes, because courts are the final arbiters
of legal issues. Furthermore, opinions are understood to assume that the arbiter has all of
the relevant facts, and will properly apply the law to the facts; that is, an opinion is based
on a hypothetical perfect judge and is not a warranty that a judge won't go off the reservation and make an unsupported decision.
Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., Reorganization Tax Opinions, 641 PLI/TAX 451, 483 (2004).
47. Robert Rothman, The Least Fun Part of the Job or a Tax Lawyer's Guide to Acquisition
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price for such asset if the seller can defer or avoid recognizing a taxable
gain from the disposition. 48 In such a scenario, the seller would likely
not want to proceed with the proposed transaction if the assumed tax
benefits were not fairly certain to be realized. A favorable tax opinion
regarding the tax consequences of the sale can comfort the seller that the
sales price is reasonable in light of the predicted favorable tax
consequences.49
2. Regulation
Attorneys are subject to a variety of regulations in rendering tax
advice. 50 They are subject to the regulations under Treasury Department
Circular 230, which sets forth standards that a tax practitioner must
comply with in providing certain tax opinions.51
Circular 230
regulations apply to "covered opinions"52 involving transactions having
tax avoidance as their principal purpose and transactions with a
Agreements, 55 TAX LAW 711, 741 (2002).

48. See, e.g., Canal Corp. v. Comm'r, 135 T.C. 199, 203-04 (2010).
49. See generally, Rothman, supra note 47.
50. Attorneys are generally governed by state model rules of professional conduct. In
addition, tax attorneys are governed by American Bar Association ("ABA") Standards of Practice,
which address matters concerning income tax advice, taxpayer representation before taxing
authorities, and preparation of income tax returns. Kip Dellinger, Thinking about Tax Practice
Standards and Conduct, TAXES: THE TAX MAGAZINE, Feb. 2012, at 20; see ABA Comm. on Ethics
and Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 85-352(1985). Accountant professional conduct, on the other
hand, is governed by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants ("AICPA"), which
publishes and enforces a code of professional conduct against its members. Dellinger, supra at 20.
51.
I.R.S. Circular 230 (June 3, 2011) (containing the rules governing practice before the IRS
and is codified at 31 C.F.R. Subtitle A, Part 10) [hereinafter I.R.S. Circular].
52. See id. at § 10.35(b)(2).
A covered opinion is written advice.., by a practitioner concerning one or more Federal
tax issues arising from:
(A) A transaction that is the same as or substantially similar to a transaction that, at the
time the advice is rendered, the Internal Revenue Service has determined to be a tax
avoidance transaction and identified by published guidance as a listed transaction under
26 CFR 1.601 l-4(b)(2);
(B) Any partnership or other entity, any investment plan or arrangement, or any other
plan or arrangement, the principal purpose of which is the avoidance or evasion of any
tax imposed by the Internal Revenue Code; or
(C) any partnership or other entity, any investment plan or arrangement, or any other
plan or arrangement, a significant purpose of which is the avoidance or evasion of any
tax imposed by the Internal Revenue Code if the written advice(1) Is a reliance opinion;
(2) Is a marketed opinion;
(3) Is subject to conditions of confidentiality;
or
(4) Is subject to contractual protection.

AKRON TAX JOURNAL

[28:123

significant tax-avoidance purpose, 53 provided the opinions meet certain
conditions. 54 Circular 230 applies if: (1) the opinion reaches a level of
confidence that permits the taxpayer to rely on the opinion to avoid
penalties,55 (2) the opinion will be used to market the transaction,56 (3)
the tax advisor requires the taxpayer to maintain the confidentiality of
the advisor's tax strategies, or (4) the advisor's fees are conditioned on
the taxpayer obtaining the intended tax benefits. 57 If an advisor fails to
comply with Circular 230 regulations, he may be subject to censure,
suspension, or disbarment from practice before the IRS if he is shown to
be incompetent or disreputable,58 or fails to comply with any regulation
under Circular 230. 59
If the above conditions are met, and Circular 230 applies, an
attorney providing a covered opinion must abide by the following
requirements. First, the attorney must use reasonable efforts to identify
and ascertain the facts, which may relate to future events if a transaction
is prospective or proposed, and determine which facts are relevant. The
53. "For purposes of [§ 10.35], the principal purpose of a partnership or other entity,
investment plan or arrangement, or other plan or arrangement is the avoidance or evasion of any tax
imposed by the Internal Revenue Code if that purpose exceeds any other purpose." Id. at (c)(10).
54. The focus here is only on advisors engaged in tax planning, meaning experts providing
tax advice priorto the taxpayer engaging in a transaction.
55. I.R.S. Circular, supra note 51 at §§ 10.35(b)(2)(i)(C)(1). These standards apply if the
opinion concludes that there is a greater than fifty percent likelihood that the tax treatment of an
item will be upheld if challenged by the IRS and does not include a prominent statement that the
opinion may not be used by the taxpayer for the purpose of avoiding penalties. Id.
56. Id. at (b)(2)(i)(C)(2), (b)(5)(i).
Written advice is a marketed opinion if the practitioner knows or has reason to know that
the written advice will be used or referred to by a person other than the practitioner (or a
person who is a member of, associated with, or employed by the practitioner's firm) in
promoting, marketing or recommending a partnership or other entity, investment plan or
arrangement to one or more taxpayer(s).
Id. at (b)(5)(i).
57. Id. at (b)(2)(i)(C)(7), (b)(7). These standards apply if the taxpayer has the right to a full
or partial refund of fees if all or a part of the intended tax consequences from the matters addressed
in the opinion are not sustained, or if the fees are contingent on the taxpayer's realization of tax
benefits from the transaction. Section 10.35(b)(7) provides that "[aIll the facts and circumstances
relating to the matters addressed in the written advice will be considered when determining whether
a fee is refundable or contingent, including the right to reimbursement of amounts that the parties to
a transaction have not designated as fees or any agreement to provide services without reasonable
compensation." Id. at (b)(7).
58. Incompetence and disreputable conduct for which a practitioner may be sanctioned under
Circular 230 § 10.50 includes, inter alia, "[g]iving a false opinion, knowingly, recklessly, or
through gross incompetence, including an opinion which is intentionally or recklessly misleading,
or engaging in a pattern of providing incompetent opinions on questions arising under the Federal
tax laws." Id. at § 10.51(a)(13).
59. Id. at § 10.50(a). Tax preparers are also subject to penalties for understatement of
taxpayer's liability. See I.R.C. § 6694(a)(1) (2008).
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opinion must identify and consider all facts that the practitioner
determines to be relevant. He must also not base the opinion on any
unreasonable factual assumptions. Second, the opinion must relate the
applicable law to the relevant facts. In so doing, the attorney must not
assume the favorable resolution of any significant Federal tax issue 60 or
otherwise base his opinion on any unreasonable legal assumptions,
representations, or conclusions. Third, the opinion must consider all
significant Federal tax issues, 6 1 which requires that the opinion provide
the advisor's conclusion as to the likelihood that the taxpayer will
prevail on the merits with respect to each significant Federal tax issue
considered in the opinion. 62 Regarding a marketed opinion--one used
by a promoter in promoting, marketing, or recommending an entity,
investment plan, or arrangement to one or more other taxpayer(s)-"the
opinion must provide the practitioner's conclusion that the taxpayer will
prevail on the merits at a confidence level of at least more likely than not
with respect to each significant Federal tax issue." 63 Fourth, "the
opinion must provide the [attorney's] overall conclusion as to the
likelihood that the Federal tax treatment of the transaction or matter that
is the subject of the opinion64is the proper treatment and must state the
reasons for that conclusion.
3. Compensation Restrictions
Circular 230 mandates that a tax practitioner, including attorneys,
accountants, and enrolled agents, may not charge an "unconscionable
fee" for representing a client in a matter before the IRS.65 Though "no
60. I.R.S. Circular, supra note 51, at § 10.35(b)(3):.
A Federal tax issue is a question concerning the Federal tax treatment of an item of income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit, the existence or absence of a taxable transfer of
property, or the value of property for Federal tax purposes.... [A] Federal tax issue is
significant if the Internal Revenue Service has a reasonable basis for a successful challenge and its resolution could have a significant impact, whether beneficial or adverse
and under any reasonably foreseeable circumstance, on the overall Federal tax treatment
of the transaction(s) or matter(s) addressed in the opinion.
Id.
61. Except as otherwise provided in Circular 230 § 10.35(c)(3)(v) (limited scope opinions)
and § 10.35(d) (reliance on the opinion of another practitioner).
62. I.R.S. Circular, supra note 51, at § 10.35(c)(3)(ii). "Inevaluating the significant Federal
tax issues addressed in the opinion, the practitioner must not take into account the possibility that a
tax return will not be audited, that an issue will not be raised on audit, or that an issue will be
resolved through settlement if raised." Id. at (c)(3)(iii).
63. Id. at (c)(3)(iv).
64. Id. at (c)(3)(v)(3)(B)(ii).
65. Id. at § 10.27(a). Section 10.27 defines "any matter before the IRS" to include tax
planning and advice, including rendering written advice with respect to any entity, transaction, plan,
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definition is provided in the Circular, 'unconscionable' generally means
affronting the sense of justice, decency, or reasonableness, or having no
conscience or being unscrupulous., 66 "Absent guidance [from the
IRS] ... , [a practitioner should] assume that 'unconscionable' conveys

something more offensive than 'unreasonable."' '67 Tax attorneys,
however, are also subject to the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct (hereinafter "Model Rules"). Pursuant to the Model Rules,
attorneys may not charge an "unreasonable" fee, which is a more
stringent standard than "unconscionable" and applies to all other nonattorney practitioners. The factors to consider in determining the
reasonableness of a fee charged by an attorney include:
(1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service
properly; (2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment
by the lawyer; (3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; (4) the amount involved and the results obtained; (5)
the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances; (6)
the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
per(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers 68
forming the services; and (8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.

No practitioners, however, may charge a contingent fee for services
rendered in connection with any matter before the IRS pertaining to tax
planning or return preparation. 69 In assessing a fee's reasonableness,
what is ultimately at issue is the reasonable value of the services

or arrangement. Id. at (c)(2).
66. JONATHAN G. BLATTMACHR, MITCHELL M. GANS, & DAMEN Rios, THE CIRCULAR 230
DESKBOOK § 4:9.1 (2012).
67. Id. Something may be unreasonable but not severe enough to rise to the degree of being
unconscionable. But cf MODEL RULES OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY R 1.5 (2012 ed.) [hereinafter
MODEL RULES].

68. BLATTMACHR, supra note 66, §4:9.1 n.135. See Rodriguez v. Ancona, 868 A.2d 807
(Conn. App. Ct. 2005) (holding that by looking solely to amount involved and results obtained in
fixing fees as percentage of damage award, "[t]he court abused its discretion by seizing from the full
panoply of relevant factors merely one factor, to the exclusion and disregard of the others"); see
also Heng v. Rotech Med. Corp., 720 N.W.2d 54 (N.D. 2006) (holding that all reasonableness
factors must be considered; no single factor controls); see also In re O'Brien, 29 P.3d 1044 (N.M.
2001) (holding that a lawyer who charged $5,000 without work product to justify it; "any fee is
excessive when absolutely no services are provided").
69. I.R.S. Circular, supra note 51, at § 10.27(b). A contingent fee is one which includes a fee
based upon whether a position taken on a return or other filing avoids challenge by the IRS or is
based on a percentage of a refund of taxes saved or a result obtained or in which a practitioner will
reimburse a client for fees paid in the event a position is challenged or not sustained. Id.
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rendered and value received by the client.7 ° However, one should be
careful to note that there is no restriction in Circular 230 or in the rules
of professional conduct prohibiting an attorney from accepting a general
retainer. 7'
C.

Taxpayer Reliance Defense 72
Even though the "penalty system serves a crucial role in fostering

voluntary compliance with the tax law[,] ... Congress generally has

rejected the automatic imposition of penalties for understatements of tax
because of the complexity and uncertainty of many tax rules and
principles. 7 3 Section 6664 permits a taxpayer to avoid Section 6662
penalties if the taxpayer shows reasonable cause for its position and that
it acted in good faith in taking such position. 74 In some instances, a
taxpayer may establish reasonable cause and good faith by showing that
the taxpayer reasonably relied in good faith on professional tax advice.75
"The determination of whether a taxpayer acted with reasonable
cause and in good faith is made on a case-by-case basis, taking into
account all pertinent facts and circumstances. ' 76 "Generally, the most
70. Regions Bank v. Automax U.S.A., L.L.C., 858 So. 2d 593 (La. Ct. App. 2003).
71. A general retainer buys a lawyer's availability for a particular representation or a
particular time period. It is considered earned when paid. See, e.g., Ryan v. Butera, 193 F.3d 210,
(3d Cir. 1999) (holding that a general non-refundable retainer of $1 million for only ten weeks of
work enforceable when client offered initial, one-time payment as "carrot" to attract counsel with
"special capability"). A general retainer fee is earned when paid whether or not lawyer actually
performs services for client. Iowa Sup. Ct. Disciplinary Bd. v. Piazza, 756 N.W.2d 690, 696 (Iowa
2008).
72. This article focuses on tax advice obtained regarding the tax consequences of transactions
prior to their occurrence. This is to be distinguished from advice regarding the filing a tax return
(i.e., whether one is required or when it is to be filed). See, e.g., U.S. v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241 (1985)
(holding that "[tihe failure to make a timely filing of a tax return is not excused by the taxpayer's
reliance on an agent, and such reliance is not "reasonable cause" for a late filing"), citing Ferrando
v. United States, 245 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1957) (holding that taxpayers have a personal non-delegable
duty to file a return on time, and that reliance on an attorney to fulfill this obligation does not
constitute "reasonable cause" for a late filing). "Advice" is "any communication, including the
opinion of a professional tax advisor, setting forth an analysis or conclusion by a person other than
the taxpayer and on which the taxpayer relied in preparing the return; [it] does not have to be in any
particular form." Gates, supra note 17, § 20.1.5.6.4, 3.
73. David T. Moldenhauer, Penalty Protection Opinions and Advisor Conflicts of Interest,27
AKRON TAX J. 55, 56 (2011-2012).
74. I.R.C. §§ 6664(c)-(d) (2013).
75. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b) (2013). Reliance on professional tax advice is not,
however, always determinative. See also, Nevada Partners Fund, LLC ex rel. Sapphire II, Inc. v.
United States, 714 F.Supp.2d 598, 609 (S.D. Miss. 2010) (ruling that there is no reasonable reliance
when taxpayers put on notice by IRS notices given to accountant).
76. Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b). Reasonableness is a fact-specific determination with many
variables, and the question turns on the "quality and objectivity of the professional advice

AKRON TAX JOURNAL

[28:123

important factor is the extent of the taxpayer's effort to assess the
taxpayer's proper tax liability., 77 "Circumstances that may indicate
reasonable cause and good faith include an honest misunderstanding of
fact or law that is reasonable in light of all of the facts and
circumstances, including the experience, knowledge, and education of
the taxpayer., 78 Though reliance on professional advice does not
necessarily demonstrate reasonable cause and good faith, such reliance
may constitute reasonable cause and good faith if, under all the
circumstances, such reliance was reasonable and the taxpayer acted in
good faith.79

The reasonable reliance and good faith defense to the accuracyrelated penalty is analyzed from the perspective of the taxpayer. 80 No
penalty is imposed for negligence or intentional disregard of rules or
regulations or a substantial understatement of income if the taxpayer
shows that the underpayment was due to reasonable cause and the
taxpayer acted in good faith. 8' "Reasonable cause requires that the
taxpayer have exercised ordinary business care and prudence as to the
disputed item., 82 "The good faith, reasonable reliance on the advice of
an independent, competent [tax] professional as to the tax treatment of
an item may meet this requirement." 83 Professional advice "may be
relied upon reasonably when [the advisor] arrives at that advice
independently, taking into account, among other things,
the taxpayer's
' 84
purposes for entering into the underlying transaction."
The Regulations provide that "all facts and circumstances must be

obtained." Nevada Partners Fund, 714 F.Supp. 2d at 639-40.
77. Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b). See, e.g., Illes v. Comm'r, 982 F.2d 163, 166 (6th Cir. 1992)
(holding reliance unreasonable absent proof that taxpayer investigated the challenged investment or
sought independent professional advice).
78. Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b).
79. Id. (emphasis added).
80. "While it is true that actual reliance on the tax advice of an independent, competent
professional may negate a finding of negligence, see, e.g., Boyle, 469 U.S. at 250, the reliance itself
must be objectively reasonable in the sense that the taxpayer supplied the professional with all the
necessary information to assess the tax matter and that the professional himself does not suffer from
a conflict of interest or lack of expertise that the taxpayer knew of or should have known about."
Neonatology Assoc., P.A. v. Comm'r, 299 F.3d 221, 234 (3d Cir. 2002); see also. Treas. Reg. §
1.6664-4(c) (2013).
81. See I.R.C. § 6664(c) (2013); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6662-3(a); Treas. Reg. 1.6664-4(a).
82. DeCleene v. Comm'r, 115 T.C. 457, 476 (2000); see also U.S. v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241
(1985).
83. DeCleene, 115 T.C. at 476 (emphasis added); see also Boyle, 469 U.S. 241.
84. DeCleene, 115 T.C. at 477. Reliance is unreasonable, however, when the taxpayer knew,
or should have known, that the adviser lacked the requisite expertise to opine on the tax treatment of
the disputed item. Id.
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taken into account in determining whether a taxpayer has reasonably
relied in good faith on [professional] advice... as to the treatment of the
taxpayer.., under Federal tax law." 85 In making such determination,
"the taxpayer's education, sophistication and business experience will be
relevant in determining whether the taxpayer's reliance on tax advice
was reasonable and made in good faith.",86 In order for a taxpayer to
reasonably rely upon such advice, negating the accuracy-related penalty,
the taxpayer must prove: (1) the adviser was a competent professional
who had sufficient expertise to justify reliance; (2) the taxpayer provided
necessary and accurate information to the adviser; and87 (3) the taxpayer
actually relied in good faith on the adviser's judgment.
In determining whether a taxpayer's reliance on professional tax
advice was reasonable and in good faith,88 courts have generally
considered whether the advisor had a conflict of interest in rendering the
advice and whether the understatement was with respect to a "reportable
transaction." 89 Despite Boyle's holding that it is reasonable for a
taxpayer to rely on the advice of an attorney regarding a matter of tax
law, 90 "courts have repeatedly held that it is unreasonable for a taxpayer91
to rely on a tax adviser actively involved in planning the transaction
and tainted by an 'inherent' conflict of interest...[and that an] adviser
with a stake in the outcome has such a conflict of interest. 9 2
85. Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(c).
86. Id. "Reasonable cause has been found when a taxpayer selects a competent tax adviser,
supplies the adviser with all relevant information and, in a manner consistent with ordinary business
care and prudence, relies on the adviser's professional judgment as to the taxpayer's tax
obligations." Canal Corp. v. Comm'r, 135 T.C. 199, 218 (2010); Boyle, 469 U.S. at 250-51.
87. DeCleene, 115 T.C. at 477 (holding that taxpayers actually relied in good faith on
disinterested professional advisers who structured the transactions and prepared their return); 106
Ltd. v. Comm'r, 136 T.C. 67, 77 (2011), aff'd, 684 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
88. "The advice must not be based on unreasonable factual or legal assumptions and must not
unreasonably rely on representations, statements, findings, or agreements of the taxpayer or any
other person." Canal, 135 T.C. at 218.
89. See I.R.C. § 6662A (2013). "Reportable transaction" is a transaction that has as a
significant purpose the avoidance or evasion of Federal income tax. Id. at 6662(b)(2)(B). The
reasonable cause and good faith exception to § 6662 penalties does not apply to any "reportable
transaction" unless: " (B) there is or was substantial authority for such treatment, and (C) the
taxpayer reasonably believed that such treatment was more likely than not the proper treatment."
I.R.C. §§ 6664(d)(3)(B)-(C) (2013).
90. U.S. v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 251 (1985).
91. See I.R.C. § 6664(d)(4)(B). Reliance on a "promoter" takes the "good-faith out of goodfaith reliance." 106 Ltd., 136 T.C. at 79. A promoter is "an adviser who participated in structuring
the transaction or is otherwise related to, has an interest in, or profits from the transaction." Id.
(citing Tigers Eye Trading, LLC v. Comm'r, 97 T.C.M. (CCH) 1622 (2009)).
92. Canal, 135 T.C. at 218. See e.g., CMA Consol., Inc. & Subsid., Inc. v. Comm'r, T.C.
Memo 2005-16 (2005) (holding that advisers involved in the marketing tax avoidance scheme are
not objective, thus reliance is unreasonable). The most obvious case of an inherent conflict of
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Though "reasonable cause" may be established when a taxpayer
shows that he reasonably relied on the advice of an attorney regarding
matters of tax law, even when such advice turns out to have been
mistaken, 93 the ability to rely on such advice is not unlimited. Indeed,
Section 6664 provides that certain opinions may not be relied upon to
establish reasonable cause under any circumstances. 94 A taxpayer may
not rely on a disqualified tax advisor or on disqualified opinions in
establishing reasonable cause and good faith. A tax advisor is
disqualified if the advisor:
(I) is a material advisor95 .. and participates in the organization, management, promotion, or sale of the transaction or is related ...to any
person who so participates,
(I1) is compensated directly or indirectly by a material advisor with respect to the transaction,
(Ill) has a fee arrangement with respect to the transaction which is contingent on all or part of the intended tax benefits from the transaction
being sustained, or
has a
(IV) as determined under regulations prescribed by the Secretary,
96
disqualifying financial interest with respect to the transaction.

A disqualified opinion is one that:
(1) is based on unreasonable factual or legal assumptions (including
assumptions as to future events),
(2) unreasonably relies on representations, statements, findings, or
agreements of the taxpayer or any other person,
(3) does not identify and consider all relevant facts, or
(4) fails to meet any other requirement as the Secretary may pre-

interest is where the tax professional's fee for a favorable opinion is contingent on a percentage of
the intended tax savings. See generally, Boelter, supra note 18, § 3:155.
93. Boyle, 469 U.S. at 250 (advising that it was unnecessary to file a return, even when such
advice turned out to have been mistaken, may establish "reasonable cause" for failure to file a
return).
94. With respect to a reportable transaction, reasonable cause requires that (1)there is or was
substantial authority for such treatment, and (2) the taxpayer reasonably believed that such
treatment was more likely than not the proper treatment. I.R.C. § 6664(d)(3) (2013).
95. A material advisor is a person "(i) who provides material aid, assistance, or advice with
respect to organizing, managing, promoting, selling, implementing, insuring, or carrying out any
reportable transaction, and (2) who directly or indirectly derives gross income in excess of a
threshold amount ... for such aid, assistance or advice." I.R.C. § 611 l(b)(l).
96. I.R.C. § 6664(d)(4)(B)(ii).
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scribe.

97

In general, courts have held that a taxpayer may not rely on an
advisor to establish the reasonable cause defense when such advisor is a
promoter 98 of a scheme to avoid tax liability, i.e., a tax shelter, 99 is
actively involved in planning the transaction and tainted by an
"inherent" conflict of interest, 100 or when the compensation for the
advisor's opinion is contingent on the taxpayer-client achieving the
anticipated tax savings. Additionally, a taxpayer is unlikely to establish
reasonable reliance when he fails to conduct his own independent
investigation, seek independent advice, or is negligent'0° in complying
with the I.R.C.' °2 Furthermore, courts have distinguished advice
97. Id. at § 6664(d)(4)(B)(iii).
98. "[A]n adviser who participated in structuring the transaction or is otherwise related to,
has an interest in, or profits from the transaction. .. is considered a 'promoter' of the transaction[.]"
Tigers Eye Trading, LLC v. Comm'r, 97 T.C.M. (CCH) 1622, 19 (2009).
99. Section 1.6662-4 of the Treasury Regulation states:
For purposes of § 6662(d), the term "tax shelter" means(A) A partnership or other entity...,
(B) An investment plan or arrangement, or
(C) Any other plan or arrangement,
if the principal purpose of the entity, plan or arrangement, based on objective evidence,
is to avoid or evade Federal income tax. The principal purpose of an entity, plan or arrangement is to avoid or evade Federal income tax if that purpose exceeds any other purpose. Typical of tax shelters are transactions structured with little or no motive for the
realization of economic gain, and transactions that utilize the mismatching of income and
deductions, overvalued assets or assets with values subject to substantial uncertainty,
certain nonrecourse financing, financing techniques that do not conform to standard
commercial business practices, or the mischaracterization of the substance of the transaction. Id. The existence of economic substance does not of itself establish that a transaction is not a tax shelter if the transaction includes other characteristics that indicate it is a
tax shelter.
Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(g)(2)(2013).
100. Canal Corp v. Comm'r, 135 T.C. 199, 218 (noting that an adviser with a stake in the
outcome of the transaction has an inherent conflict of interest). See generally, Moldenhauer, supra
note 73, at 59.
In many.., cases, the tax professionals' conflicts of interest were clear and egregious:
tax professionals who developed or marketed artificial tax shelters, prepared documents
that created the illusion of legitimate business transactions, based their opinions on inaccurate factual assumptions, and were paid based on whether the taxpayer entered into the
transaction, or claimed the alleged tax savings.
Id.
101. "Negligence may be indicated where a taxpayer fails to make a reasonable attempt to
ascertain the correctness of a deduction that would seem to a reasonable and prudent person 'too
good to be true' under the circumstances." CMA Consol., Inc. v. Comm'r, T.C.M., T.C. Memo
2005-16, *48 (2005).
102. See, e.g., Goldman v. Comm'r, 39 F.3d 402, 407 (2d Cir. 1994) (ruling that no reasonable
reliance where taxpayer accepts promoter's claims of sizeable tax deductions without obtaining
objective opinion).
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concerning tax law and substantive investment advice. 103
As a general rule, a taxpayer need not challenge an independent and
competent adviser, confirm for himself that the advice is correct, or seek
a second opinion n 4 Reliance on an advisor, however, does not
necessarily get the taxpayer "off the hook."' 0 5 Courts have consistently
rejected the reasonable reliance and good faith defense where the IRS
informs a taxpayer that the advisor or promoter is supplying inaccurate
advice, 0 6 where a taxpayer relies on the advice of promoters without
seeking independent advice,' 07 where a taxpayer is approached by a firm
with which a taxpayer had no prior relationship for an investment in a
tax shelter,'0 8 and where a taxpayer was aware that the expected tax
benefits were "too good to be true" under the circumstances.'09
While the regulations under Section 6664 do not explicitly preclude
a taxpayer from relying on advice from an advisor having a conflict of
interest, 10 the courts have developed the guiding principle that a
taxpayer's reliance on advice is not reasonable and in good faith where
such taxpayer knew, or should have known, that his advisor had a
significant conflict of interest."' An advisor has an "obvious" conflict3
2
of interest where the advisor is a promoter of a tax shelter, 1 a broker,"
103. See, for example, Klein v. United States, 94 F.Supp.2d 838, 851 (E.D. Mich. 2000),
where the court noted that, "by its terms, the Boyle court discussed only accountants and attorneys
who were providing advise [sic] about a matter of tax law, such as whether a liability exists....
[and did not discuss anything,] even by implication, about substantive investment advice." Id.; see
also, U.S. v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 251 (1985). The Klein Court also noted that "the decision to
make an investment is legally and analytically distinct from the decision as to what tax
consequences one will assert as a result of that investment." Klein, 94 F.Supp.2d at 851.
104. Boyle, 469 U.S. at 251. A taxpayer is not reasonable, however, in relying on an adviser
burdened with an inherent conflict of interest about which the taxpayer knew or should have known.
Am. Boat Co., LLC v. United States, 583 F.3d 471, 481 (7th Cir. 2009).
105. Boyle, 469 U.S. at 251. (reliance must be reasonable under the circumstances).
106. See, e.g., Mortensen v. Comm'r, 440 F.3d 375 (6th Cir. 2006).
107. Pastemak v. Comm'r, 990 F.2d 893, 903 (6th Cir. 1993).
108. New Phoenix Sunrise Corp. & Subs. v. Comm'r, 132 T.C. 161 (2009).
109. See, e.g., Stobie Creek Invest., LLC v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 636, 708 (Fed. Cl
2008), aff'd, 608 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ("'[Taxpayer] was allegedly told by the promoters of
the shelter, who were charging a [ ] $6 million fee for the shelter-calculated as 3% of the income
to be sheltered from taxation-that the purchase of options costing $2 million would result in
avoiding tax on a $204 million gain."') (citing Defendant's Brief).
110. See generally, I.R.C. § 6664(d)(4)(B) (2013).
111. Moldenhauer, supra note 73, at 68.
112. See, e.g., Stobie Creek, 608 F.3d at 1381-83; Mortensen v. Comm'r, 440 F.3d 375, 38788 (6th Cir. 2006); Van Scoten v. Comm'r, 439 F.3d 1243, 1253-54 (10th Cir. 2006); Pasternak v.
Comm'r, 990 F.2d at 903 (6th Cir. 1993); lies v. Comm'r, 982 F.2d 163, 164-66 (6th Cir. 1992);
Maguire Partners-Master lnvs., LLC v. United States, No. CV 06-07371-JFW(RZx), 2009 WL
4907033 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2009); Murfam Farms, LLC ex. rel. Murphy v. United States, 94 Fed.
Cl. 235, 247-48 (Fed. Cl. 2010); Jade Trading, LLC v. United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 11, 56-57 (Fed. Cl.
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has a referral arrangement with a promoter,' 4 or where the advisor's
fees are contingent upon the taxpayer achieving certain tax benefits or
savings. 115 In many of these types of situations, the advisor also
develops or implements a tax shelter. Sometimes, however, the conflict
of interest is less apparent, such as where the advisor develops or
implements a tax strategy, but does not engage in marketing activity and
has no relationship with a tax shelter promoter. t 6 The IRS, Congress,
and the courts have failed, however, to provide a practical definition of
"inherent conflict of interest" to permit practitioners and taxpayers to
determine whether a tax opinion may be relied upon for purposes of the
accuracy-related penalties.
D.

Canal Corp v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

In Canal Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,1 17 the Tax
Court held that the taxpayer-corporation was subject to accuracy-related
penalties, rejecting the taxpayer's reasonable reliance and good faith
defense. In Canal, the IRS imposed Section 6662 accuracy-related
penalties based on the following relevant facts: a wholly owned
subsidiary ("W") of Chesapeake, the parent company and taxpayer at
issue, proposed to transfer its assets and most of its liabilities to a newly
formed partnership (the "LLC") in which W and Georgia Pacific
("GP"),
8
1
interests.
ownership
have
would
corporation,
an unrelated
Chesapeake hired Salomon Smith Barney ("Salomon") and PwC,
an accounting firm, to advise it on structuring the transaction with GP. "9
"Salomon recommended to Chesapeake's management that the best

2007), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, vacated in part sub noma., Jade Trading, LLC ex rel. Ervin v.
United States, 598 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 106 Ltd.v. Comm'r, 136 T.C. 67, 79 (2011); New

Phoenix, 132 T.C. at 193-95; Kerman v. Comm'r, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) 1241 (2011); Palm Canyon X
Inv.,
LLC v. Comm'r, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 574 (2009).

113. Stobie Creek, 608 F.3d at 1381-83; Goldman v. Comm'r, 39 F.3d 402, 408 (2d Cir.
1994); Neonatology Assoc., P.A. v. Comm'r, 299 F.3d 221, 234 (3d Cir. 2002) (insurance agent).
114.
Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund v. United States, 472 F. Supp. 2d 885, 904-05 (E.D. Tex.
2007), ajfd on other grounds, 568 F.3d 537 (5th Cir. 2009); Alpha 1, L.P. v. United States, 93 Fed.
Cl. 280 (Fed. C1. 2010).

115.
116.

Moldenhauer, supranote 73, at 68-69.
Id. at 69; see, e.g., Canal Corp. v. Comm'r, 135 T.C. 199,199 (2010); Am. Boat Co., LLC

v. United States, 583 F.3d 471, 481-83 (7th Cir. 2009).
117.
Canal, 135 T.C. 199.

118.

Canal, 135 T.C. at 199 (2010). The impetus of the transaction was for Chesapeake to

divest itself of W, its wholly owned subsidiary. Id.

119. Id. at 203. Chesapeake determined that a direct sale of its subsidiary would not have
been advantageous because the after-tax proceeds would have been low compared to the pre-tax
proceeds. 1d.
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alternative for maximizing shareholder value would be a leveraged
partnership with GP.,' 20 "PwC assisted Salomon in negotiating and
structuring the joint venture."'' 21 PwC examined the transaction from
both an accounting and a tax perspective.122 PwC determined that the
contribution to the LLC was tax-free, but concluded that the transaction
should be treated as a sale for accounting purposes. 123 "[Chesapeake]
also asked PwC to issue an opinion on the tax consequences of the
transaction and conditioned the closing on PwC issuing a 'should'
opinion 124 that the transaction qualified as tax free." 125

Chesapeake

agreed to pay PwC an $800,000 fixed fee, payable at the closing of the
transaction, for issuing the opinion. 26 "PwC issued an ['should']
opinion that the transaction should not be treated as a taxable sale but
to a partnership.... 121
rather as a tax free [sic] contribution of property
' 128
GP.
to
W subsequently sold its LLC interest
Chesapeake reported a gain from the sale on its consolidated
Federal income tax return for 2001 when Chesapeake sold its interest in
the LLC. 129 "[The IRS] determined that Chesapeake should have
120. Id. "Salomon presented the leveraged partnership structure as tax advantageous to
Chesapeake because it would allow Chesapeake to get cash out of the business yet still protect
Chesapeake from recognizing a gain." Id.
121. /d. at 204.
122. Id. PwC had served as Chesapeake's auditor and tax preparer for many years. The PwC
partner, Mr. Compton, with the long-term relationship to Chesapeake assigned the duty of writing
the opinion regarding the transaction he helped structure to another PwC advisor, Mr. Miller, a
licensed attorney. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 205. "A 'should' opinion is the highest level of comfort PwC offers to a client
regarding whether the position taken by a taxpayer will succeed on the merits [if challenged by the
IRS]." Id. at 206.
125. Id. at 199. "Chesapeake made [it] clear to PwC and Salomon that the asset transfer...
had to be non-taxable for it to approve the transaction. Tax deferral enabled Chesapeake to accept a
lower price [for its subsidiary]." Id. at 204.
126. According to the court, the $800,000 fee did not depend on time spent or expenses
incurred by PwC. Id. at 206.
127. Id. at 199. "Mr. Miller and his PwC team reviewed the transaction's structure and
approved each item that could affect the tax consequences." Id. at 206. Mr. Miller reviewed the
transaction using a test he created using his own analysis of then existing rulings and procedures;
there was no legal foundation for the test used. Id. The transaction closed on the same day PwC
issued the "should" opinion. Id.
128. Id. at 199.
129. Id. On its 1999 tax return:
Chesapeake disclosed the transaction on Schedule M of the return and reported
$377,092,299 book gain, but no corresponding tax gain. Chesapeake treated the special
distribution as non-taxable on the theory that it was a debt-financed transfer of considChesapeake reported a $524 million capital gain
eration, not the proceeds of a sale ....
on its consolidated Federal tax return for 2001.
Id. at 208-209
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'
reported a gain when W contributed its assets to the LLC in 1999." 130
The IRS also asserted a $36,691,796 accuracy-related penalty under
Section 6662 for substantial understatement of income tax.' 31
In
defending the Section 6662 penalties, "Chesapeake claim[ed] it
reasonably relied in good faith on PwC's tax advice and 'should'
opinion and therefore no penalty should be imposed."' 132 The court,
however, agreed with the Commissioner in finding "that Chesapeake
unreasonably relied on an opinion riddled with improper assumptions
written by a tax adviser with a conflict of interest."' 33 Because
Chesapeake paid PwC an $800,000 flat fee for its "should" opinion,
rather than a fee based on time devoted to preparing the opinion, the
court questioned, "how much time could have been devoted to the draft
opinion because it is littered with typographical errors, disorganized and
incomplete" and doubted "that any firm would have had such a cavalier
approach if the firm was being compensated solely for time devoted to
rendering the opinion."'' 34 The court found it inherently unreasonable
for Chesapeake to have relied on such an opinion.
Additionally, the court found that Chesapeake did not act in good
faith by relying on PwC's advice.' 35 Though Chesapeake argued that it
had every reason to trust PwC's judgment because of its long-term
relationship with the firm, the court ruled that "PwC crossed over the
line from trusted adviser for prior accounting purposes to advocate for a
position with no authority that was based on an opinion with a high price
tag-800,000."' 136 Further, the court opined that any advice received
from PwC was tainted by an "inherent conflict of interest" because PwC
not only researched and drafted the tax opinion but also audited the
LLC, and because PwC essentially issued an opinion on a transaction it
helped plan "without the normal give-and-take in negotiating terms with
an outside party."' 137 The court also found the $800,000 price tag

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. at 199.
Id.
Id.at 218.
Id. In so finding, the Tax Court only considered a draft of the "should" opinion.
Id. at 219. The court further stated:

We are also nonplused by Mr. Miller's failure to give an understandable response when
asked at trial how PWC could issue a "should" opinion if no authority on point existed.
He demurred that it was what Chesapeake requested. The only explanation that makes
sense to the Court is that no lesser level of comfort would have commanded the
$800,000 fixed fee that Chesapeake paid for the opinion.
Id. at 219-20.
135. Id. at 220-21
136. Id. at 220.
137. Id. at 220-21. See generally,Moldenhauer, supra note 73, at 59. In many cases
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exorbitant and noted that PwC had "a large stake in making sure the
closing occurred" because the fee was payable and contingent on the
closing of the joint venture transaction. 138 In sum, the court stated:
"Considering all the facts and circumstances, PwC's opinion looks more
' 39
like a quid pro quo arrangement than a true tax advisory opinion.'
Accordingly, in the courts opinion, PwC lacked the independence
necessary for Chesapeake to establish good faith reliance.
III. ANALYSIS

After reviewing the accuracy-related penalties under I.R.C § 6662,
the reasonable reliance defense provided for in I.R.C § 6664, the
Circular 230 requirements, and after thorough review of the relevant
case law, including Canal, the tax attorney and his client are still left
without any clear answer, or even a clear indication, from the courts, the
IRS, or Congress, as to when a taxpayer may reasonably rely on an
attorney's tax opinion and what an attorney must do in order to furnish a
reliable opinion to the taxpayer-client.
The authorities have presented the taxpayer with a difficult and
costly conundrum. For one, the complexity of the Code and the cost of
non-compliance with its requirements (i.e., civil and, possibly, criminal
liabilities), whether intentional or not, deter even a highly adept
businessman from attempting to "go it alone" without the assistance of
tax counsel who has been trained on and has worked through the Code's
intricate provisions. On the other hand, if the taxpayer does consult
counsel, and counsel provides the taxpayer with an opinion regarding his
tax situation (i.e., regarding tax liability from a completed transaction or
tax planning for a proposed transaction), it is unclear when and whether
the taxpayer can rely on such opinion.
The authorities discussed and relied upon herein consistently make
legal conclusions as to a taxpayer's "good faith and reasonable reliance,"
or lack thereof, on an opinion and as to an advisor's "inherent conflict of
interest," which, as the courts have concluded, rendered such opinion
patently unreliable. Further, as the Canal court noted for example, the

the factors suggesting a conflict of interest were subtle: the tax advisor developed or implemented
the tax strategy; the tax strategy was separable from the underlying business transaction; the tax
advisor influenced the facts on which his opinion was based; the tax advisor did not charge standard
hourly rates, or agreed to receive a fee that was contingent on the completion of the transaction; or
the tax advisor's legal analysis contained omissions or errors.
Id. at 59-60
138. Canal, 135 T.C. at 221.
139. Id.
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Regulations provide that in order to rely on professional advice, such
advice "must not be based on unreasonable factual or legal
14
assumptions" ' 140 and "tainted by an inherent conflict of interest." 1
Indeed, an opinion that relies on unreasonable factual or legal
assumptions is obviously unreliable. But, how is the taxpayer, who
consulted a professional advisor due to the Code's complexity, supposed
to recognize that his advisor made "unreasonable factual assumptions,"
assuming the taxpayer provided all the relevant information that the
advisor requested? Moreover, how should the taxpayer be able to
recognize an "unreasonable legal conclusion," and why would he doubt
that his advisor gave an opinion based on erroneous law? Boyle, to the
contrary, stands for the proposition that a taxpayer is not required to
"second guess" his own attorney's conclusions of law. 142 Additionally,
to require a taxpayer to ask specific questions for the purpose of
determining for himself whether the advice is erroneous is unrealistic,
not to mention unfair, for it would essentially require the taxpayer to
understand all of the various taxes to which he could possibly be subject;
if the taxpayer had this knowledge, there would be no need to seek the
advice of an expert in the first place. 143 Yet, that is exactly what the
courts have required of taxpayers.
Further, it is unclear what exactly constitutes "an inherent conflict
of interest," which the Canal court plainly concluded made the
144
taxpayer's reliance on PwC's "should" opinion flagrantly unreliable.
The court does nothing more than conclude that a "professional advisor
145
with a stake in the outcome has [an inherent] conflict of interest,"
without any further analysis of what exactly was PwC's inherent conflict
of interest. The court failed to state how and why the taxpayer should
have doubted PwC's tax opinion in light of the fact that the taxpayer
"had every reason to trust [PwC's] judgment because of its long-term
relationship with the firm."' 146 The court subsequently concluded that
"[PwC] crossed over the line from trusted advisor for prior accounting
purposes to advocate for a position with no authority that was based on
an opinion with a high price tag-800,000."'' 47 But the question still
140.
141.
142.
143.
1950).
144.
145.

Id.at 218.
Id. (emphasis added).
See U.S. v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241 (1985).
See generally Haywood Lumber & Mining Co. v. Comm'r, 178 F.2d 769, 771 (2d Cir.
Canal, 135 T.C. at 218.
Id.

146.

Id.at220.

147.

Id.
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remains: how should the taxpayer have known that its long-time
advisors, accountants, and lawyers, crossed "over the line" and became
unreliable? The fact is that the court's primary issue with the opinion
was the price the taxpayer paid, which the court characterized as "an
opinion with a high price tag,"' 148 for which "no lesser level of comfort
[than 'should'] would have commanded
the $800,000 fixed fee that
49
opinion."1
the
for
paid
Chesapeake
The problem with the court's analysis, if one could characterize it
as such, is that the authorities relied upon for its conclusion that the
taxpayer "acted unreasonably in relying on the advice of [PwC] given
the inherent and obvious conflict of interest,"' 50 were cases considering
the advice from tax shelter promoters, who were clearly not disinterested
or objective advisors. 15' There is an obvious difference between cases in
which the tax advisors are promoters of a tax shelter and cases, such as
Canal, in which the advisors had long-time relationships with the client
and where the client contacted the advisors for assistance in structuring a
proposed transaction.
There are, of course, two competing fact scenarios that illustrate the
reasonableness of a taxpayer's reliance on his advisor's opinion. On the
one hand, an advisor will be considered disinterested, objective, and
reliable where:
the tax advisor has a long-term and continual relationship with the taxpayer, the advisor does not give unsolicited advice to the taxpayer, the
advisor advises only within his field of expertise, the advisor follows
his regular course of conduct in rendering the advice, the advisor
charges only his regular hourly rate, and the advisor has no other stake
in the transaction. I52

This scenario would be considered "ideal." On the other hand, an
advisor has a clear conflict of interest, which the taxpayer should
recognize, where the advisor develops or markets artificial tax shelters,
prepares documents that create the illusion of legitimate business
148.

Id.

149.

Id.

150.

Id. at 221.

151. See generally New Phoenix Sunrise Corp. v. Comm'r, 132 T.C. 161, 192-194 (2009)
(holding that reliance on opinion by law firm actively involved in developing, structuring and
promoting transaction was unreasonable in face of conflict of interest); see also CMA Consol., Inc.
v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 2005-16, *49 (2005) (holding that reliance not reasonable as advice not
furnished by disinterested, objective advisers); see also lies v. Comm'r, 982 F.2d 163, 164-66 (6th
Cir. 1992) (holding that reasonable reliance precluded where accountant was "not a disinterested
source," because he was tax shelter promoter).
152. Moldenhauer, supra note 73, at 59-60.
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transactions, bases his opinion on inaccurate factual assumptions, and is
paid based on whether the taxpayer enters into the transaction or claims
the purported tax benefits.1 53 Such an opinion would clearly be
unreliable and the taxpayer would be hard-pressed to claim good faith
and reasonable reliance on such advice. These competing scenarios,
however, are on two opposite ends of the spectrum. The problem, of
course, is that there is no test, standard, statute, or regulation to guide the
taxpayer when his particular situation falls somewhere in the middle of
the spectrum. Some conflicts of interest are subtle, while others are
obvious or egregious. And, the courts seemingly place the burden on the
taxpayer to determine whether his advisor is reliable, essentially
requiring the taxpayer to monitor or second-guess his advisor, which the
Boyle court clearly thought unreasonable.
Though the burden is on the taxpayer to prove that he relied upon
his advisor in good faith and that his reliance was reasonable, the
taxpayer and his advisor are left without any guidance to evaluate the
taxpayer's reliance on his advisor's advice when the situation is not
"ideal." In practice, the "ideal" situation is surely not the norm. Indeed,
in practice there are frequently cases where, for example, a taxpayer
engages a tax advisor for the first time to handle a transaction, or where
an advisor brings a transaction to his client or alerts the client of the need
for tax advice, or where an advisor takes a role in negotiating the
commercial terms of a transaction on which he is providing tax advice,
or where an advisor makes relevant factual inquiries that are beyond his
specific area of expertise, or where a taxpayer and an advisor agree to a
fixed fee or a fee that depends on whether the transaction ensues. 154
As discussed above, the purpose of tax penalties is to promote
voluntary compliance with the Federal tax laws. Thus, with such
purpose in mind, the reasonable cause and good faith defense serves to
encourage taxpayers to make more reliable predictions about their
proper tax treatment and to avoid penalizing taxpayers who did not have
reason to know that their tax return positions were incorrect. Indeed, the
foundation of the attorney reliance defense is based on the principle that:
To impute to the taxpayer the mistakes of his consultant would be to
penalize him for consulting an expert; for if he must take the benefit of
his counsel's or accountant's advice cum onere, then he must be held
to a standard of care which is not his own and one which, in most cas-

153.
154.

Id. at 59.
Id. at 60.
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es, would be far higher than that exacted of a layman. 155
Of course, the taxpayer must act reasonably to claim good faith reliance
on an opinion. Accordingly, in order to serve the purposes of the
reasonable cause and good faith defense, an opinion must: (1) be based
on all pertinent facts and circumstances and the related law; (2) take into
account the taxpayer's purposes and their relative weight; (3) not be
based on unreasonable assumptions or rely unreasonably on factual
sources; and (4) be supported by certain types of legal authority and
reach conclusions at a minimum level of confidence. 56 If any one of
these factors is lacking, an opinion is patently unreliable.
Assuming the advisor satisfies the above requirements, the taxpayer
has yet to establish that he reasonably relied on the advice in good
faith. 157 This is where the reliance defense becomes an unreasonable
burden for the taxpayer. The burden becomes unreasonable at the point
when the taxpayer realizes that he needs tax advice and subsequently
hires tax counsel. In addition to providing counsel with all necessary
information, this should be all that is required on the taxpayer. That is
all that was required by the Boyle court.
The IRS, however, has managed to rig the game by forcing the
taxpayer to hire counsel because of the complexity of the I.R.C, while
simultaneously forcing the taxpayer to know and understand the tax law
This
in order to determine if his counsel's opinion is correct.
undermines the entire reason for obtaining counsel. Instead of forcing
the taxpayer to monitor counsel and "check his work" to ensure that
counsel did his job correctly, the onus for providing reliable advice
should be on tax counsel, not on the taxpayer. If, after being provided
with all the necessary information, tax counsel delivers an opinion to the
taxpayer that, with a reasonable degree of probability, the predicted tax
consequences are likely to come to fruition, the taxpayer should be able
to act in reliance on such opinion. Boyle firmly established the principle
that:
When an accountant or attorney advises a taxpayer on a matter of tax
law, such as whether a liability exists, it is reasonable for the taxpayer
to rely on that advice. Most taxpayers are not competent to discern error in the substantive advice of an accountant or attorney. To require
the taxpayer to challenge the attorney, to seek a "second opinion," or
to try to monitor counsel on the provisions of the Code himself would

155.
156.
157.

Haywood Lumber & Mining Co. v. Comm'r, 178 F.2d 769, 771 (2d Cir. 1950).
See generally,Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4 (2013).
Id. at § 1.6664-4(c).
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nullify the very purpose of seeking the advice of a presumed expert in
the first place ..... "Ordinary business care and prudence" do not demand such actions. 158
Accordingly, the proper analysis of the taxpayer's reasonable
reliance on tax counsel's opinion should look not to the taxpayer's
ability to discern counsel's error, but to the tax attorney who provided
the opinion. Indeed, a tax attorney is not merely a tax expert; he is also
an attorney. As such, the attorney has ethical responsibilities to his
client that reach beyond those imposed on non-attorney practitioners.
Among the responsibilities imposed is the duty to act in the client's best
interests.' 5 9 Additionally, the Model Rules obligate all lawyers to
"exercise independent professional judgment and render candid
advice."' 60 Indeed, the client "is entitled to straightforward advice
expressing the lawyer's honest assessment."' 6 1 Therefore, the analysis
of whether the taxpayer-client is entitled to rely on his advisor's opinion
should begin with the advisor.
As a starting point to the analysis, it must be remembered that in a
tax return or in paying Federal income tax, a taxpayer is only required to
"exercise ordinary business care and prudence"' 162 and engaging an
attorney's assistance in complying with the Code's provisions is plainly
an exercise of "ordinary business care and prudence."' 63 Although a
taxpayer has a non-delegable duty to promptly file tax returns, such duty
requires only that a taxpayer know that tax returns have fixed filing dates
and that taxes must be paid when they are due. 164 Such duty does not
require, however, that the taxpayer have a working understanding of the
Code's provisions, as would be necessary in order to determine that
counsel's advice is erroneous. Thus, when a taxpayer engages a tax
attorney to assist in planning a transaction, and where such attorney is
asked to render an opinion regarding potential tax consequences of a
proposed transaction, such a taxpayer has met his burden and it becomes
the tax attorney's duty to provide accurate and honest advice to the
taxpayer-client, while also abiding by the attorney's primary ethical
65
responsibility to operate in the client's best interest.'
158.
159.

U.S. v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 251 (1985) (emphasis in original).
MODEL RULES, supra note 67, at R 1.4 cmt. 5, Explaining Matters (2010).

160.

Id.at R 2.1.

161.
162.
163.

Id. at R 2.1, cmt. 1
Treas. Reg. § 301.6651-1(c)(1).
See Boyle, 469 U.S. at 250.

164.

Id.

165.
Bradley T. Borden & Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Giving Legal Advice in the Face of
Uncertainty, 1960 PLI/CORP 425, 470 (2012). The primary ethical responsibility to operate in the
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Accordingly, the taxpayer's reasonable reliance defense must be
analyzed in light of his attorney's obligation to render a candid, honest,
and reliable opinion to the client. The analysis must directly take into
account the tax attorney's ethical and professional responsibilities owed
to the client and to the tax system generally. In rendering tax advice or
opinions, attorneys are subject to the following rules and derivative
responsibilities: the Model Rules, Circular 230, and ABA Formal Ethics
Opinions interpreting the Model Rules as applied to tax practice. When
rendering tax advice, tax counsel must abide by the following guiding
principles:
1. Attorneys have a broad duty of competence requiring the lawyer to
provide "the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation." This duty requires the attorney to make "inquiry into and analysis of the factual and legal eleand procedures meeting the
ments of the problem, and use of methods
166
practitioners."
competent
of
standards
2. Circular 230 requires tax practitioners to exercise due diligence with
respect to, among other things, factual representations and valuation issues. A tax professional "must make inquiry as to all relevant facts, be
satisfied that the material facts are accurately and completely described ...

and assure that any representations as to future activities

are clearly identified, reasonable, and complete." 167 This standard is
violated if the attorney assumes the facts, conclusions, and opinions
that form the basis of his own opinion.
3. The lawyer "should fulfill reasonable client expectations for information consistent with the duty to act in the client's best interests, and
the client's
overall requirements as to the character of representa168
tion."
4. A lawyer must exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice.169 A client "is entitled to straightforward advice
expressing the lawyer's honest assessment," and while legal advice
"often involves unpleasant facts and alternatives," a lawyer "should
not be deterred from giving candid advice by the prospect that the advice will be unpalatable to the client." The lawyer violates this Rule
by failing to provide the client information with respect to adverse authority or honest prospects for success on the merits pertaining to the
client's best interests includes, at a minimum, protecting clients from liability. Id.
166.

MODEL RULES, supra note 67, at R 1.1.

167.

I.R.S. Circular, supra note 51, at § 10.33(a)(1)(i).
MODEL RULES, supra note 67, at R 1.4, cmt. 5.
Id.at R 2.1

168.

169.
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70

lawyer's advice and opinions. 1

5. A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in
conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer
may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct
with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the

law. 171
The burden, therefore, is on the attorney to render advice to the
taxpayer that can be relied upon in preparing his return and defending
IRS accuracy-related penalties should they be imposed. It is the
attorney's obligation to provide the taxpayer with an opinion that is not
disqualified, 172 to recognize when he is a disqualified tax advisor, 173 and
to inform the client when he may not be relied upon. Given that it is a
lawyer's duty to act in his client's best interest, such duty would be
violated if the advisor gave the taxpayer-client an unreliable opinion,
potentially subjecting the client to substantial penalties. Further, even if
a client requests a specific course of action, i.e., the "should" opinion
requested by the taxpayer in Canal, it is the lawyer's obligation to act
independently and render candid and honest advice. Accordingly, if the
PwC advisor could not reach a "should" opinion regarding the tax
consequences of the proposed sale, it was his duty to not give such an
opinion.
Beginning the analysis with the advisor also comports with the
potential liability arising out of an ill-advised opinion. An attorney may
face civil malpractice liability to the client due to an erroneously given
tax opinion. Under common law tort principles, a professional has a
duty to exercise the level of skill, care, and diligence that is commonly
possessed and exercised by other members of the profession under
similar circumstances.1 74 Contract law, similarly, generally deems an
attorney to have made a promise to represent each client competently
and diligently. 175 Further, due to the existence of an attorney-client
relationship, the duty to exercise reasonable skill and care in
representing the client is imposed on the attorney. 176 An erroneous
opinion, however, is not necessarily negligent, potentially subjecting the
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id. at R2.1, cmt. 1.
Id. at R 1.2(d).
I.R.C. § 6664(d)(4)(B)(iii) (2013).
Id. at § 6664(d)(4)(B)(ii).
Bob Woodward, Tax Opinions, 2010 A.B.A. SEC. PUB. TAX'N, I 2(B)(1).
Id.
Id.
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attorney to a malpractice claim. And certainly, an opinion is not a
guarantee of the result. Where the law is uncertain, the fact that a
practitioner's opinion turns out to be incorrect does not necessarily
establish negligence, provided the attorney's judgment was reasonable
and based upon what was known at the time the opinion was rendered. 7' 7
Accordingly, the question in a malpractice case is not whether the
attorney's judgment ultimately turned out to be right or wrong; rather,
sufficient research
the critical issue is whether the practitioner performed
78
to make an informed and reasoned decision. 1
This analysis also comports with the Circular 230 standards of
conduct for practice before the IRS § 10.37 imposes six duties on a tax
advisor: the advisor (1) may not make unreasonable legal assumptions;
(2) may not make unreasonable factual assumptions; (3) may not
unreasonably rely on representations or statements made by others; (4)
must consider all relevant facts in formulating the advice; (5) must apply
the law to the facts; and (6) must reach conclusions regarding the law
and facts. 179 These duties are imposed on the advisor, not on the
taxpayer.
Accordingly, the Canal court's conclusion that it was
"inherently unreasonable for Chesapeake to have relied on an analysis
based on the specious legal assumptions," imposed a burden on the
taxpayer that was not its burden to meet. In other words, the taxpayer
engaged a tax attorney to render advice regarding the potential
consequences of the proposed transaction. Therefore, by reason of the
attorney-client relationship that then arose, it became PwC's duty to
render candid and honest advice; and, despite the taxpayer's request for
a "should" opinion, PwC violated its duties owed to the taxpayer by
issuing an opinion that could not be relied upon. It is patently
unreasonable for the court to require the taxpayer to recognize the
"specious legal assumptions" because, as Boyle held, ordinary care and
business prudence do not require the taxpayer to challenge the attorney,
to seek a second opinion, or to try to monitor counsel on the provisions
of the Code himself, as it would nullify the very
purpose of seeking the
180
advice of a presumed expert in the first place.
In light of Boyle, and the duties imposed on the attorney in
177.

Id.; see also Smith v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 366 F.Supp. 1283 (D. La. 1973),

aff'd, 500 F.2d 1131 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding that, where the attorney's informed and reasoned
opinion was invalidated only by a later case, liability for malpractice could not be imposed).
178. See Home v. Peckham, 97 Cal. App. 3d 404, 416 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (noting that the
existence of uncertainty in the law does not relieve the attorney of the duty to do reasonable
research into the law).
179. I.R.S. Circular, supra note 51, at § 10.37.
180.

U.S. v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 251 (1984).
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representing the taxpayer-client arising by virtue of the attorney-client
relationship and Circular 230, it is unreasonable for the courts to make
an after-the-fact finding that the taxpayer could not have reasonably and
in good faith relied on his attorney's opinion. By engaging an attorney
in the first place, assuming the taxpayer complied with counsel's
requests for relevant information and provided the same, the taxpayer
has met his burden and should be entitled to rely on his counsel's
opinion. The law still stands that: when an attorney advises a taxpayer
on a matter of tax law, such as whether a liability exists, it is reasonable
for the taxpayer to rely on that advice because most taxpayers are not
8
competent to discern error in the substantive advice of an attorney.' '
Indeed, in general, the most important factor in determining whether a
taxpayer acted with reasonable cause and in good faith is the "extent of
' 82
the taxpayer's effort to assess the taxpayer's proper tax liability."'
Under prevailing law, engaging an attorney surely constitutes a
considerable effort to assess the taxpayer's proper tax liability.
Accordingly, in evaluating the taxpayer's reasonable reliance on an
opinion, the taxpayer should be entitled to rely on an expert's opinion as
to matters of substantive tax law.
Thus far, this analysis has focused on the reasonable reliance
element of the reasonable cause and good faith defense to section 6662
penalties. The second factor, of course, is that the taxpayer must have
relied upon the opinion and acted in good faith. 183 The Regulations
state, in part, that:
In no event will a taxpayer be considered to have reasonably relied in
good faith on advice (including an opinion) unless the requirements of
this paragraph (c)(1) are satisfied .... For example, reliance may not
be reasonable or in good faith if the taxpayer knew, or reasonably
should have known, that the advisor lacked knowledge in the relevant
aspects of Federal tax law. 184
The Regulations subsequently state the elements that the advice must
have been based upon and considered, i.e., all facts and circumstances
considered and no unreasonable assumptions.
Again, these
considerations rest in the province of the attorney's preparation of the
advice, not on the individual taxpayer's actions. The Regulations,

181.

Id.

182. Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b)(1) (2013).
183. Reliance on professional advice constitutes reasonable cause and good faith if, under all
the circumstances, such reliance was reasonable and the taxpayer acted in good faith. Id.
184. Id. at § 1.6664-4(c)(1).
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however, do not describe what is required of a taxpayer in order to "act
in good faith"; rather, the Regulations and cases dealing with the defense
merely state what does not constitute good faith. For example, the good
faith requirement was not satisfied where an opinion was written after
the taxpayer had already filed his income tax return, the opinion was
unsigned, and the taxpayer made no inquiries into the firm's
qualifications.18 Good faith was also not satisfied where the taxpayer
participated in a tax shelter because of the alluring tax benefit of
claiming tax losses. The improbable tax advantages offered by the tax
shelter should have alerted a person with the taxpayer's business
experience and sophistication as to the shelter's illegitimacy. 186
Generally, good faith has not been found when: (1) the taxpayer
entered into a tax shelter for the purpose of creating artificial losses and
knew, or should have known, that the tax results were "too good to be
true"; (2) when the opinion was formed after the taxpayer had already
filed his tax return; and (3) when the taxpayer, not the advisor, decided
how to characterize a gain or loss. Neither the Code nor the Regulations
define "good faith," and thus reference to the dictionary definition must
be considered. Black's Law Dictionary defines "good faith" as: "A state
of mind consisting in (1) honesty in belief or purpose, (2) faithfulness to
one's duty or obligation, (3) observance of reasonable commercial
standards of fair dealing in a given trade or business, or87 (4) absence of
intent to defraud or to seek unconscionable advantage." 1
Thus, once a taxpayer has engaged an attorney to render an opinion,
his reliance thereon should be presumed reasonable unless the taxpayer
knows, or should know, that the opinion facially inaccurate, or that the
advisor is obviously not disinterested. The good-faith analysis should
turn on whether the taxpayer provided accurate and truthful information
as requested by the advisor and whether the taxpayer followed the
advisor's advice in structuring the proposed transaction or in preparing
his tax return. For example, a taxpayer would not be acting in good faith
if he knew that he was participating in a tax shelter with the purpose of
generating artificial losses, or if the taxpayer provided the advisor with
false factual information. However, where the taxpayer provides the
advisor with accurate information and proceeds with structuring a
transaction pursuant to the advice, there is no reason for the taxpayer to
be deemed to have acted in bad faith. To be sure, complying with expert

185.
186.
187.

See, e.g., Dunlap v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 2012-126 (2012).
See, e.g., 106 Ltd. v. Comm'r, 684 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 762 (9th ed. 2011).
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advice is completely reasonable. Additionally, because the most
important factor in determining the taxpayer's good faith is the extent to
which he attempted to accurately determine his proper tax liability,
engaging an attorney is surely a good-faith attempt to meet such
standard.
Accordingly, applying the above analysis to the situation faced in
Canal, the conclusion is obvious: the Tax Court should not have held the
taxpayer liable for the Section 6662 accuracy related penalty because the
taxpayer relied on PwC, its long-time tax advisor's opinion, complied
with their requests, and proceeded with the transaction in accordance
with PwC's advice and opinion. The taxpayer, Chesapeake, engaged
two nationally renowned firms-Salomon, an investment bank, and
PwC, an accounting firm-to explore strategic alternatives for the sale
of one of Chesapeake's major assets because a direct sale of the asset
would have produced significant income tax consequences and would
have made the sale disadvantageous. Salomon presented the strategy
that the taxpayer subsequently followed in order to defer recognition on
the sale of the asset. The taxpayer's board of directors liked the strategy
presented and engaged PwC to issue an opinion regarding the
transaction's Federal tax implications. PwC and the taxpayer agreed that
the $800,000 fee would be paid at the closing of the transaction. PwC
subsequently issued a "should" opinion to the taxpayer stating that the
recommended strategy would produce the desired tax deferral, enabling
the taxpayer to accept a lower price for the asset: $775 million. Despite
complying with expert advice from two independent firms, each having
their own respective duties to act in the taxpayer's best interests and
PwC having the duty to give candid and honest advice to the taxpayer
because the PwC consultant was an attorney, the IRS asserted a
$36,691,796 accuracy-related penalty pursuant to Section 6662 for
substantial understatement of income tax.
Although the court noted that "[r]easonable cause has been found
when a taxpayer selects a competent tax adviser, supplies the adviser
with all relevant information and, in a manner consistent with ordinary
business care and prudence, relies on the adviser's professional
judgment as to the taxpayer's tax obligations,"'' 88 the Tax Court
concluded that the taxpayer unreasonably relied on "an opinion riddled
with improper assumptions written by a tax adviser with a conflict of
interest."' 89 Further, the court concluded, "the opinion was riddled with
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questionable conclusions and unreasonable assumptions,"190 and that it
was inherently unreasonable for the taxpayer to have relied on an
analysis based on specious legal assumptions. The court also found
price tag the taxpayer paid PwC for its advice and
suspect the exorbitant
"should" opinion.' 91
Applying the analysis presented above, the court's conclusions
were unreasonable. For one, the court's only authority for stating that
the advisors had inherent conflicts of interest were cases dealing with tax
shelter opinions, where the advisor brought the investment to the
taxpayer for the purpose of creating artificial losses where the advisors
were tax shelter promoters. Further, even though the court cited Boyle,
it failed to consider its proposition that a taxpayer is not required to
monitor counsel's analysis of substantive tax law as applied to the
taxpayer's factual situation. The court's entire analysis focused on the
opinion's legal analysis, which was the province of the attorney-advisor,
not of the taxpayer. There was no evidence that the taxpayer knew that
PwC's legal analysis was ill advised or that the taxpayer provided PwC
with erroneous factual information. Moreover, even though the taxpayer
was a corporation and, presumably, well experienced in business
transactions, there was no evidence that the taxpayer's board of directors
were tax experts or that it doubted, or had any reason to doubt, PwC's
expertise. Additionally, the court's characterization of the fee as
"exorbitant" and as a quid pro quo arrangement is unfounded. First, the
fee, $800,000, in relation to the sale price of the asset, $775 million, is
not inherently unreasonable (or unconscionable).' 92 Second, PwC bore
the risk that if its opinion was erroneous, it would potentially be liable
for professional malpractice, which would require PwC to pay damages,
at a minimum, equal to the amount of the IRS penalty, which was
$36,691,796. This risk is most likely what prompted the "large" fee, as
the risk to PwC was significant.
The fact is, the court held the taxpayer to an unreasonable standard.
On the one hand, it was entirely reasonable for the taxpayer to engage a
tax advisory firm to render an opinion. However, on the other hand, the
court concluded that it was unreasonable to rely on such firm's advice.
The errors the court found unreasonable were all errors in legal analysis
for which the taxpayer should not be held responsible. Additionally,
190.
191.
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there was no evidence that the taxpayer lacked good faith in complying
with the advice, as it followed Solomon and PwC's strategy to the letter.
In sum, the court held the taxpayer liable for its advisor's poor legal
analysis. This was patently unreasonable, as the taxpayer was not a tax
law expert, engaged competent and reputable independent advisors, and
had no reason to question the firm's advice or reliability. Although the
legal advice turned out to be erroneous upon an after-the-fact review by
the court, all that is required of the taxpayer is that it reasonably relied
upon the advice and acted in good faith. There is no evidence that the
taxpayer acted to the contrary. Therefore, it should not have been held
liable for the accuracy-related penalties.
IV. CONCLUSION
Tax practitioners should remember that they are members of a
profession. They should not only abide by the Circular 230 regulations,
but should also remember that they are attorneys and must follow the
established ethical rules of conduct of their profession and not sell their
souls simply to receive a large fee. While non-attorney practitioners
have ethical obligations to their taxpayer-clients and to the IRS,
attorneys have much broader obligations. Attorneys, as members of the
legal profession, are not only representatives of their clients, imposing
significant professional and ethical responsibilities, but are also officers
of the legal system and have special responsibilities for the quality of
justice. 193 And, while attorney-practitioners may encounter conflicting
responsibilities between their responsibilities to clients and to the IRS,
attorneys must remain zealous advocates of their clients' legitimate
interests within the bounds of the law.' 94 These ethical and professional
obligations may never take a backseat to the prospect of earning a large
fee. Because of the dual-obligations to the client and to the legal system,
generally, and to the IRS specifically, the taxpayer should be relieved of
his responsibilities under the Code if he follows the practitioner's advice
in good faith and should not be held to the same legal standards as his
advisor.
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